Grenfell Tower Inquiry Final Report Published

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• Grenfell Tower Inquiry Final Report Published

04 September 2024

More than seven years after the Grenfell Tower fire, the inquiry has published its final report, outlining the root causes of the fire.

Introducing the 14-part report, Inquiry Chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick said that all of the 72 deaths resulting from the Grenfell Tower fire were “avoidable” and that the residents of Grenfell Tower had been “badly failed over a number of years”.

An executive summary of the Inquiry states that “the fire at Grenfell Tower was the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry to look carefully into the danger of incorporating combustible materials into the external walls of high-rise residential buildings and to act on the information available to them.”

 

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Key Takeaways from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Final Report 

 

The Government Missed Opportunities to Identify Risks

 

The report suggests that the government at the time failed to identify risks posed by the use of combustible cladding panels and insulation in high-rise buildings. The Department for Communities and Local Government was “well aware” of the risks but did not heed warnings correctly, particularly after a Environment and Transport Select Committee in December 1999 raised the danger of certain external cladding systems.

The government is also responsible for not removing external wall panel benchmarks (Class 0) that were not fit for purpose, despite being made aware of the danger on several occasions. 

Between 2012 and 201, major cladding fires as a result of polymeric insulation and aluminium composite panels with unmodified polyethylene cores were also brought to the department’s attention numerous times.  

 

The Building Research Establishment Failed to Warn the Government on Dangers

 

The Building Research Establishment’s (BRE) testing of the fire safety of external walls was described as being “marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour.” This meant that key information about fire safety testing was not drawn to the government’s attention.

BRE’s reports into previous major fires were deemed “far from comprehensive” and gave the government the false impression that the regulations and guidance were working effectively.

 

Dishonesty of Manufacturers

 

Companies that manufactured and sold cladding panels and insulation products were found to have deliberately manipulated testing processes, misrepresenting data and misleading the market. Arconic Architectural Products, who manufactured and sold the Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen panels used in the external walls of Grenfell Tower, deliberately concealed the danger of using these highly flammable products. Arconic Architectural Products was fully aware by late 2007 that the panels performed badly in fires, but continued to allow customers in the UK to purchase it, despite a fire-resistant version being available.

The manufacturers of the foam insulation used at Grenfell are also at fault. Celotex manufactured combustible polyisocyanurate foam insulation which was then tested in accordance with BS 8414 in May 2014. The test was found to be incomplete and misleading, and the fact that it passed the  BS 8414 test meant that Celotex could market the insulation as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”, despite BS 8414 being wholly unsuitable for classifying individual products. 

 

The National House Building Council Gave in to Commercial Pressures

 

The National House Building Council was found to have been complicit in a culture of not wanting to “upset its own customers” by revealing the scale of the use of combustible insulation in the external walls of high-rise buildings. The report found that the pressure of commercial interests prevented the body from being “essentially regulatory.”

 

Grenfell’s Fire Assessor was “Ill-Qualified” for the Role

 

The fire assessor responsible for Grenfell Tower “drifted” into their role without being subject to a formal procurement process. They were found to misrepresent their experience and qualifications and were not qualified to carry out fire risk assessments on buildings of the size and complexity of Grenfell Tower.

 

Rainscreen Panels Were Chosen Due to Budget Restrictions

 

The aluminium composite material (ACM), Reynobond 55 PE, was specified in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment largely due to cost, as the project has exceeded its budget significantly. Rydon, the principal contractor, was able to offer a substantial saving through the use of ACM panels as a result of its relationship with its intended cladding sub-contractor, Harley.

 

Ineffective Management and Leadership of the London Fire Brigade

 

The report reveals significant shortcomings in the London Fire Brigade’s response, including a failure to respond effectively to the high number of phone calls seeking help from both within and outside the building. The control room was underprepared for the volume of calls, and there was a lack of training in handling fire survival guidance calls.

 

The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Demonstrated a “Marked Lack of Respect for Human Decency and Dignity”

 

The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s response to the fire was “inadequate” as it did not have effective plans to deal with the mass displacement of a large number of people from their homes. Many Muslim residents felt that there was no consideration that Ramadan was being observed at the time and that there was “no regard for their cultural and religious needs.”

 

Statutory Guidance Was Poorly Worded

 

The system of regulating the construction and refurbishment of high-rise residential buildings was found to be “seriously defective”. Approved Document B was described as “misleading”, “poorly worded” and written in such a way that it appeared to designers that compliance with its terms also meant compliance with building regulations.

The full report can be found here: https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-2-report

Picture: a poster showing the words "Grenfell" over a green heart. Image Credit: Adobe Stock

Article written by Ella Tansley | Published 04 September 2024

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